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       NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-3692 
 ___________ 
 
 IBRAHIMA LY, 
        Petitioner 
 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
   Respondent 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A094-221-860) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Dorothy Harbeck 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 18, 2012 
 
 Before:  SLOVITER, SMITH AND COWEN, Circuit 
 
Judges 
 (Opinion filed: June 20, 2012) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 The pro se petitioner, Ibrahima Ly, asks us to reverse an order of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA) that rejected his application for asylum and derivative relief.  
For the following reasons, we will deny his petition for review of the agency’s decision. 
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 Ly is a native and citizen of the Republic of Guinea who arrived in the United 
States in 2008; having overstayed his business visa, he was placed into removal 
proceedings.  Ly applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the 
United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT), arguing that he had been mistreated 
in Guinea on account of his political activity, and specifically for his membership in the 
Union for Progress and Renewal (UPR) political party.  According to his asylum 
application, Ly had become convinced that “the military dominated government of 
President Conte was a disaster for Guinea.”  Believing that the UPR was a force for 
positive change, Ly started helping the party “near the end of 2003 by importing T shirts 
with photos of the party leader and party logo on them.”  Administrative Record (A.R.) 
252.  Tragedy struck when his father, who was also a UPR member, was shot and killed 
by a government soldier while striking in 2007.  Id.  Later, Ly participated in an anti-
government meeting that was raided by the military; he was eventually apprehended and 
was imprisoned for around four months, during which period he was interrogated, beaten, 
and otherwise abused.  A.R. 253.  After obtaining “unofficial” release from custody by 
having his family bribe prison officials, Ly “made plans to save money and to get a visa 
from the U.S. Embassy to come to the United States,” successfully doing so in 2008.  
 Ly acknowledged that a recent coup in Guinea had affected the power structure that he 
feared, but insisted that “the current military leaders are just as bad or worse than 
President Conte,” reaffirming that his life would “be in danger” if he returned to Guinea.  
Id. 
Id.  In support of his application, Ly submitted, among other materials, a letter from his 
wife (A.R. 201) and a certification of his involvement with the UPR (A.R. 198). 
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 Following the close of testimony, relief was denied by an Immigration Judge (IJ), 
who found Ly to be lacking in credibility and his evidentiary proffer to be without 
sufficient corroboration.  Of particular significance to the IJ’s credibility decision was the 
fact that neither Ly’s asylum application nor his wife’s letter related that soldiers were 
still actively looking for him, whereas Ly had testified at his merits hearing that he was 
still under active scrutiny for his anti-government activities and that his wife had been 
harassed by the military.  See A.R. 94–95; see also
 Now proceeding without counsel, Ly timely petitions for review of the BIA’s 
decision.  The Government urges us to uphold the agency’s determination. 
 A.R. 140, 152 (testimony).  On 
appeal, the BIA upheld the adverse credibility and corroboration determinations, and 
although it narrowed slightly the basis of the former, it echoed the IJ’s concern that Ly’s 
written submissions “did not indicate that the military had continued to search for him” 
after his departure.  A.R. 3.  The BIA also noted that Ly had waived his CAT claims by 
failing to argue them on appeal.  A.R. 5.  
 Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), we have jurisdiction over final agency orders of 
removal.  Vera v. Att’y Gen., 672 F.3d 187, 192 (3d Cir. 2012); see also Gomez-Zuluaga 
v. Att’y Gen., 527 F.3d 330, 340–46 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing substantive asylum 
standard).  When, as here, “the BIA both adopts the findings of the IJ and discusses some 
of the bases for the IJ’s decision, we have authority to review the decisions of both the IJ 
and the BIA.”  Chen v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 215, 222 (3d Cir. 2004).  The factual 
determinations of both opinions are evaluated under the same “substantial evidence” 
standard, a deferential mode of review in which the agency’s findings of fact are 
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conclusive unless a reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the 
contrary.  Yusupov v. Att’y Gen., 650 F.3d 968, 977 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing cases); see 
also Tarrawally v. Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2003) (“Adverse credibility 
determinations are factual findings subject to substantial evidence review.”).  “Where the 
record supports plausible but conflicting inferences in an immigration case, the . . . choice 
between those inferences is, a fortiori, supported by substantial evidence.”  De Hincapie 
v. Gonzales
 Salient to our decision is the operation of the REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 
119 Stat. 231, 302 (2005), which applies because Ly first filed his asylum application 
after the Act’s effective date of May 11, 2005.  
, 494 F.3d 213, 219 (1st Cir. 2007).   
See Dong v. Att’y Gen., 638 F.3d 223, 
229 n.3 (3d Cir. 2011).  The Act affected the processes of determining credibility and 
requesting corroboration.  See Guta-Tolossa v. Holder, 674 F.3d 57, 62 (1st Cir. 2012) 
(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii)).  In assessing credibility, the agency must evaluate 
(among other factors) the alien’s “demeanor, candor, or responsiveness,” the “inherent 
plausibility” of his account, the “consistency between [his] written and oral statements” 
(accounting for “the circumstances under which the statements were made”), and the 
internal consistency of his statements and their relationship to other evidence in the 
record, “without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the 
heart of [his] claim.”  8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (emphasis added).  The presence of a 
single identified ground can suffice to support an adverse credibility determination.  Rizk 
v. Holder, 629 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Wang v. INS, 352 F.3d 1250, 
1259 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
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 Having conducted a thorough review of the administrative record, we agree with 
the Government that the omission from Ly’s written submissions of the Guinean 
military’s continued interest in pursuing him, as well as his failure to address the 
military’s active harassment of his wife, constitutes “substantial evidence” in support of 
the adverse credibility determination.  This gap went to the heart of his claim; ongoing 
military scrutiny would be extraordinarily relevant to the discussion and analysis of the 
likelihood of future persecution, as it would serve to reinforce his otherwise-generalized 
fear of remaining in Guinea (and his associated “certain[ty] that [his] life w[ould] be in 
danger if [he] return[ed] to Guinea”, A.R. 253).1
 As the Government observes, such an omission need not doom Ly’s credibility or 
his asylum application as a whole, and it was not emphasized as a potential and 
problematic discontinuity during his main merits hearing.  
  His wife, meanwhile, couched her fear 
of remaining in the familial home in a conditional tense.  She did not relate that she had 
been actually harassed by soldiers, or that the military was looking for Ly, but rather that 
she was concerned about the possibility of becoming “a victim of sexual or physical 
harassment” if she remained in the familial home.  A.R. 201. 
See Kin v. Holder
                                                 
1 The Administrative Record reveals that the other persons who submitted affidavits on Ly’s 
behalf also discussed his fear of returning to Guinea in speculative terms.  See, e.g., A.R. 198 
(affirming that Ly “will face further persecution from the New Military Junta . . . because of his 
opposition to a military government”).  
, 595 F.3d 
1050, 1056–57 (9th Cir. 2010) (observing that “[o]missions [from asylum applications] 
are not given much significance because applicants usually do not speak English and are 
not represented by counsel”; in addition, aliens should be “afforded the opportunity to 
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explain inconsistencies within their own personal testimony because the true story may 
get lost in translation”); but see id. at 1057 (“When inconsistencies exist between the 
testimony of multiple witnesses and documentary evidence, however, it is not a matter of 
a communication problem requiring clarification, but of determining how the evidence 
fits together.”).  Yet while Ly has attacked several of the other findings used to support 
the adverse credibility determination, he has not satisfactorily addressed this particular 
inconsistency in either his agency appellate documents or in his brief before this Court.  
See, e.g., A.R. 64–65 (discussing “escape” ambiguity, wife’s concern for her safety, and 
general fear of returning to Guinea); A.R. 13 (counsel: “While I cannot say for certain, I 
would imagine that his wife was afraid of the soldiers who were coming to her home, 
since prior to the departure of her husband she did not express any fear of remaining in 
her home.”) (emphasis added).  See generally Pet’r’s Br.  Accordingly, this omission was 
sufficient to support an adverse credibility determination, which (in turn) did justify the 
denial of asylum and derivative relief.2
 Thus, for the foregoing reasons, Ly’s petition for review will be denied.  
   
 
                                                 
2 Because we so hold, we need not address the “intuitively related, [but] distinct” concept of 
corroboration.  Toure v. Att’y Gen., 443 F.3d 310, 323 (3d Cir. 2006).  While the IJ’s 
corroboration and credibility inquiries were somewhat intertwined, she did not find that Ly was 
incredible because of his failure to corroborate, but rather because the material he used to 
corroborate his application further exacerbated an important omission.   
